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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2, INTELLIGENCE
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5 October 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD:

The following conversation transpired substantially between Mr. Allen Dulles and myself at and after a meeting of the IAC on 4 October.

The recent announcement by Peiping of the withdrawal of six Chinese Communist divisions from North Korea fits the pattern of troop withdrawals from that country of Chinese Communist forces for the past two years. This is the third time that the Chinese Communists have announced withdrawal of their forces. They will undoubtedly run them through the inspection teams in an orderly and legitimate fashion as heretofore. However, the pattern takes special significance at this time in view of the recent Russian peace offensive and their withdrawal from Porkkala, Austria, and Port Arthur.

The withdrawal of six divisions (approximately two armies) leaves only about five Chinese Communist armies in North Korea. Of these five, three are still in contact along the battle position. Of the remaining two, one will be disposed to block a seaborne flanking threat in the Yellow Sea in the vicinity of Chinnampo; the other one to block a similar move from the Sea of Japan in the vicinity of Wonsan. These two rear area armies also furnish the necessary support for the three armies on the line in the event of a breakthrough. It is unlikely in the event of further troop withdrawal that the Chinese would withdraw the two backup armies and leave their three front line armies in position. Such dispositions would accept an unnecessary military risk against a sudden attack by the South Koreans and would place too great a dependence on the North Korean Army for the security of Chinese forces.

One would presume, therefore, that the next withdrawal might well be a complete removal of Chinese Communist forces from North Korea to Manchuria. Such troop movements could well be made a part of a Communist psychological campaign that the United States was maintaining her armies in Korea for offensive purposes.

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
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The stationing of these Chinese Communist armies in Manchuria would still enable the Chinese Communists to re-enter Korea in a matter of weeks and rapidly build up major ground forces in the event of the resumption of hostilities. The Communists have much to gain and little to risk by complete withdrawal from Korea.


RIDGELY GAITHER
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